![]() ![]() \(N = 35\)) in any period are the \(N\) delegates that received the most votes that is, during every period a threshold of votes emerges where if you get more votes than that threshold you are a delegate, if you get less you are not, and the threshold is set so that \(N\) delegates are above the threshold. The delegate slot gives a reward of $100 per period, and candidates promise to share some portion of that as a bribe, equally split among all of their voters. There are a number of people all of which are running to be delegates. Let us create a toy economic model as follows. There are actually people who dispute this claim the usual argument has something to do with market efficiency, as in "isn't this good, because it means that the nodes that win will be the nodes that can be the cheapest, taking the least money for themselves and their expenses and giving the rest back to the community?" The answer is, kinda yes, but in a way that's centralizing and vulnerable to rent-seeking cartels and explicitly contradicts many of the explicit promises made by most DPOS proponents along the way. The second part of this article will involve me, an armchair economist, hopefully convincing you, the reader, that yes, bribery is, in fact, bad. Hmm, what other major political entity has made accepting bribes a violation of the constitution? And how has that been going for them lately? The EOS New York community's response seems to be that they have issued a strongly worded letter to the world stating that buying votes will be against the constitution. Crypto is a reflection of the world at large. What matters is that blockchains and cryptocurrency, originally founded in a vision of using technology to escape from the failures of human politics, have essentially all but replicated it. Of course, it does not matter at all who the specific actors are that are buying votes or forming cartels this time it's some Chinese pools, last time it was "members located in the USA, Russia, India, Germany, Canada, Italy, Portugal and many other countries from around the globe", next time it could be totally anonymous, or run out of a smartphone snuck into Trendon Shavers's prison cell. The article then continues to describe further strategies, like forming "alliances" that all vote (or buy votes) for each other. With no support from the developer community, facing competition from Korea, the Chinese EOS supernodes have invented a new strategy: buying votes. For a listing of the EOS officially promoted events and interactions with communities see the picture below. Since the EOS.IO official Twitter account was founded, there has never been any interaction with the mainland Chinese EOS community. Looking at community recognition, Chinese nodes feel much less represented in the community than US and Korea. Because the delegate rewards in EOS are now so high (5% annual inflation, about $400m per year), the competition on who gets to run nodes has essentially become yet another frontier of US-China geopolitical economic warfare.Īnd that's not my own interpretation I quote from this article (original in Chinese):ĮOS supernode voting: multibillion-dollar profits leading to crypto community inter-country warfare Now, the latest scandal in DPOS land seems to be substantially worse. ![]() I wrote about the issues with tightly coupled voting in a blog post last year, that focused on theoretical issues as well as focusing on some practical issues experienced by voting systems over the previous two years. Governance, Part 2: Plutocracy Is Still BadĬoin holder voting, both for governance of technical features, and for more extensive use cases like deciding who runs validator nodes and who receives money from development bounty funds, is unfortunately continuing to be popular, and so it seems worthwhile for me to write another post explaining why I (and Vlad Zamfir and others) do not consider it wise for Ethereum (or really, any base-layer blockchain) to start adopting these kinds of mechanisms in a tightly coupled form in any significant way. ![]() Governance, Part 2: Plutocracy Is Still Bad 2018 Mar 28 See all posts ![]()
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